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Abstract
Malicious Payload Distribution Channels in Domain Name System
Abdullah Mert Kara
Botmasters are known to use different protocols to hide their activities under the
radar. Throughout the past years, several protocols have been abused and recently
Domain Name System (DNS) also became a target of such malicious activities. In this
dissertation, we analyze the use of DNS as a malicious payload distribution channel.
To the best of our knowledge, this is the first comprehensive analysis of these payload
distribution channels via DNS. We present a system to characterize such channels in
the passive DNS (pDNS) traffic by modeling DNS query and response patterns. Then,
we analyze the Resource Record (RR) activities of these channels to build their DNS
zone profiles. Finally, we detect and assign levels of intensity for payload distribution
channels by using a fuzzy logic theory. Our work is based on an extensive analysis
of malware datasets for one year, and a near real-time feed of pDNS traffic. The
experimental results reveal few long-running hidden domains used by Morto worm
to distribute malicious payloads. We also found that some of these payloads are in
cleartext, without any encoding or encryption. Our experiments on pDNS traffic
indicate that our system can detect these channels regardless of the payload format.
Passive DNS is a useful data source for DNS based research, and it requires to
be stored in a database for historical data analysis, such as the work we present
iii
in this dissertation. Once this database is established, it can be used for any sort
of threat analysis that requires DNS oriented intelligence. Our aim is to create a
scalable pDNS database, that contains potentially valuable security intelligence data.
We present our pDNS database by discussing the database design, implementation
challenges, and the evaluation of the system.
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DNS is a part of our daily Internet activities, and it is tightly coupled with any
network infrastructure. It is a simple yet powerful database, which holds Internet
Protocol (IP) addresses of every domain name. Therefore, Internet users do not need
to remember the IP addresses of websites, they only remember a domain name, which
is dedicated for a particular website, e.g., google.com. DNS is a fundamental part
of any activity in the Internet, and it is attracting botmasters to use its facilities to
maintain their malicious networks.
DNS is often abused by attackers, and the recent incidents have showed that it
is still a vulnerable protocol [72, 73, 43]. Spamhaus1, a non-profit anti-spam orga-
nization, was a target of DNS based Distributed Denial of Service (DDoS) attack.
It was the biggest DDoS attack in the history, and it crippled the infrastructure
of Spamhaus [72]. Moreover, the attack almost affected the global DNS traffic [72],
which straightforwardly affects the Internet all around the globe. In another incident,
a malware family, namely DNSChanger, affected more than four million computers
in the US alone. The situation became serious that Federal Bureau of Investigation
(FBI) took over the case to fight against this profit oriented criminal activity [88]. The
1http://www.spamhaus.org/
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attack is accomplished by changing the DNS host settings on an infected machine,
therefore all DNS queries are redirected to a rogue DNS resolver, which is operated by
the botmasters. The whole eradication process required to block infected machines
from connecting to the Internet. These attacks show how fragile DNS is, and any
attack on DNS can render the Internet almost unusable.
Attackers do not only attack on DNS, they also make it a fundamental part of their
malicious networks. Recently, DNS is used by botmasters to breach secure networks
to steal sensitive information without alerting network security systems [22]. It is
used as a stealth communication channel between bots and Command and Control
(C&C) servers. The DNS traffic is often considered to be harmless, and network
administrators allow it to bypass any security monitoring. This gives an opportunity
to botmasters to send and receive data, even in highly protected networks. Compared
to other protocols (e.g., Hypertext Transfer Protocol (HTTP), Internet Relay Chat
(IRC), Peer-to-Peer (P2P)) [13, 32, 50], DNS becomes a perfect candidate for covert
channels in such networks. Moreover, its naive architecture provides facilities for data
transfer. Any existing defense technology against botnet communication channels is
rendered useless with this new type of attack. The attack is based on a vulnerability of
the DNS protocol, which allows to embed arbitrary strings in DNS query and response
packets. Botmasters send the attack payloads in DNS queries, and bots use the same
method to talk back to botmasters. In this way, a malicious payload distribution
channel is established in DNS. Because the entire communication is established in
DNS queries, the communication channel is only traceable in DNS logs, which is
often not monitored in a network. Beside, any semantic based analysis on DNS logs
might result in a high amount of false positives or negatives. It is required to have an
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approach to monitor DNS in a global scale to detect such communication channels,
and alert the authorities about domains involved.
Detecting any DNS based threat requires a hands-on experience with real DNS
data logs. This type of studies are often done by using local network DNS logs,
however local logs cannot be used to look at global trends in malicious activities.
It is important to analyze global DNS activities to understand and design defense
mechanisms against emerging threats, such as malicious payload distribution channels
in DNS. PDNS replication provides a good dataset for such studies. PDNS is a system
that is deployed on name servers to replicate DNS queries for different purposes, i.e.,
security research. For example, pDNS is used to detect botnets by analyzing DNS
query anomalies [12]. However, it is a continuous data stream, and we need to have
a historical database of pDNS to correlate previous attacks with current ones to
model the behaviors of malicious communication channels. An efficient and scalable
database solution is required to store this tremendous amount of DNS data.
1.2 Problem Statement
In this dissertation, the detection of malicious payload distribution channels in DNS,
and the design and implementation of an efficient and scalable pDNS database are
addressed. Additionally, the necessity of having such historical data for DNS based
research are discussed.
The main research questions investigated in this dissertation are:
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1. Question 1: Is it possible to model the behavior of DNS based malicious
communication channels, therefore to characterize them based on the amount
of the transferred data?
2. Question 2: How to quantify this abuse and identify the sources as well as
the involved infrastructures?
3. Question 3: Even though the data is encrypted, is it feasible and possible
to detect such malicious channels in DNS without any decryption or malware
reverse engineering efforts?
4. Question 4: In terms of efficiency and scalability, is it possible to create a
pDNS database to observe the changing behaviors of malicious payload distri-
bution channels?
1.3 Contributions
The main contributions of this dissertation are:
Detection of payload distribution channels in DNS: A malicious payload dis-
tribution channel in DNS is a new concept, which is adapted by different malware
families [29, 65]. Therefore, the analysis of these channels is very limited in the
literature, and the proposed detection mechanisms are specific to certain malware
families [29]. Our system is proposed to fill this gap in the existing research work.
First, we present a thorough analysis of such channels, and discuss the techniques
used by them. Based on the analysis, we model the behaviors of these channels
to be able to categorize different C&C communication types. The novel detection
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mechanism that we propose is based on the domain zone activities, which can detect
even encrypted communication channels. Finally, we test our system with pDNS for
one month, and we can detect long-lasting malware domains, which are previously
unknown.
Design and implementation of a pDNS database: We use pDNS which is very
useful for security investigation, however during our analysis on malicious payload
distribution channels, we needed a historical pDNS database. We are required to have
a scalable and efficient design, which can handle tremendous amount of the pDNS
traffic. Also, the lookups to the database have to be efficient. We implemented an
API and a web interface to access to the database. It is important to mention that
after the completion of writing this dissertation, my colleagues in NCFTA has started
working on the design of a pDNS database, which is based on a library (mtbl) [38]
developed by Farsight Security, Inc. [1]
1.4 Structure
The rest of this dissertation is organized as follows. In Chapter 2, we detail the
background information on DNS, DNS tunneling, and pDNS as well as existing related
work that are relevant to this dissertation. Chapter 3 presents our work on the analysis
and detection of malicious payload distribution channels in DNS. Afterwards, we
present our pDNS database design and implementation in Chapter 4, and in Chapter 5




Background and Related Work
2.1 Background
In this section, we introduce some of the concepts that are fundamental background
to the work presented in this dissertation. The section starts with a presentation
of DNS, and later we highlight DNS tunneling. Afterwards, the pDNS technique is
explained.
2.1.1 Domain Name System
The DNS protocol is designed to be a translation service for the Internet infrastruc-
ture. Every web request to a domain name is initiated by a DNS query to receive
an IP address, which corresponds to the domain name. Hence, remembering domain
names instead of numerical IP addresses simplifies the use of the Internet.
Fully Qualified Domain Name (FQDN) is a domain name that shows the location
of a computer in the DNS hierarchy. The structure of a FQDN can be considered
as a tree with multiple parts, which are placed according to a hierarchy. A FQDN
users.encs.concordia.ca. has multiple labels, which are separated by dots. The
rightmost label (ca.) is the highest level and the leftmost label (users.) is the lowest
level in this hierarchy. The start of the hierarchy is the Top-Level Domain (TLD),
therefore labels are named accordingly. ca. is the TLD, concordia.ca. is the Second-
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Level Domain (2LD), encs.concordia.ca. is the Third-Level Domain (3LD), and
so on. Any label that comes after the 2LD is considered as a sub-domain of the 2LD.
In DNS, response data is stored in authoritative name servers that are responsible
for a particular domain name. These name servers are named as Start of Authority
(SOA), and they hold the original information of a domain in a zone file. Although
authoritative name servers are the center of information for their authoritative zone,
they are often configured to be a master server, and slave name servers are setup
to respond to DNS queries. This is an optimization in the network level by system
administrators, especially for domains that receive a large amount of DNS queries,
e.g., google.com. Therefore, a zone file is an important element of an authoritative
zone in a DNS hierarchy. It defines the services running under a particular domain.
The entries in the zone file are called RRs. In a zone file, a 2LD name usually has
multiple RRs dedicated for different purposes (see Figure A.1 in Appendix). These
records consist of five main components: name, class, type, Time to live (TTL), and
data. The RR name is in FQDN form, and the sub-domains of 2LD are defined
and mapped to the corresponding RRs in the zone file. In some cases, a wild-card
(*) can be used as a label to return the same RR for any sub-domain [63]. A sub-
domain can be setup to have its own zone file with a dedicated name server. In
this case, the name server of the 2LD delegates queries to the name server of the
sub-domain. This technique is called zone delegation, and it is often used for easing
the management of different sub-zones under a domain [47]. The length of the RR
name cannot exceed 256 bytes and each label length is limited to 63 bytes [64]. The
RR class defines name spaces, that are used for different purposes within the DNS
protocol. The default value for RR class is IN, which stands for the Internet. The RR
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type indicates the type of information carried by the DNS message. In Table 2.1, we
list some of the RR types used in our work. The TTL value is a time period used by
DNS servers to determine how long to cache the response before discarding it. The























Figure 2.1: Recursive DNS Query and DNS Hierarchy
The protocol is designed to be a simple database lookup with queries and re-
sponses. The query is started at the host machine by its stub resolver, which is a
simple resolver that initiates DNS queries. Stub resolvers delegates the query to a






TXT Text information associated with a name
CNAME Canonical name or an alias name
Table 2.1: DNS RRs Used in our Work
interacts with the DNS hierarchy to receive the answer for the query. In a typical
scenario, a user puts a FQDN (sz.example.com) in the address bar of a web browser
to start browsing the Internet. As he presses the enter key, the stub resolver on the
host machine sends a DNS query to the local DNS resolver as seen in Figure 2.1.
If the resolver does not have a cached copy of the RR, it starts querying the DNS
hierarchy by starting from the root DNS servers. These servers are the backbone of
the entire DNS infrastructure and they hold the IP address information of authorita-
tive name servers of TLDs. Based on the TLD of the query, root servers return the
corresponding IP address of a name server to the DNS resolver. The next step, the
DNS resolver queries to this name server to receive the IP address of the name server
that is authoritative for the 2LD of the query. As seen in Figure 2.1, the recursive
query continues until it reaches to the final zone, where the response of the original
query is stored.
DNS-based Security Measures
Sender Policy Framework (SPF) [89], Domainkeys Identified Mail (DKIM) [5], Domain-
based Message Authentication, Reporting and Conformance (DMARC) [55], and Op-
portunistic Encryption (OE) [78] are existing specifications, which are facilitated by
Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF), that use DNS as a part of their mechanism.
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They are used to protect domains, hence domain owners, against different types of
security threats. To implement these specifications, the domain administrators cre-
ate entries in the zone file of their domains. Because the operational data of these
specifications is in text form, they are often stored in TXT RR, which is the a flexible
RR type in terms of the syntax format.
SPF defines the authenticated mail servers that can use a particular domain for
emails. When a mail server receives an email, it can verify whether the received
email can be sent by that particular IP address or not by querying the TXT RR of
the 2LD of the email address domain. The same applies to DKIM, which is used for
authenticating emails that are sent by a domain. This security mechanism is rather
applied to emails by verifying a signature in the email header. The verification is done
by simply receiving the public key of the email address domain, which is stored in the
TXT RR. DMARC is a specification that creates a layer between email recipients and
existing specifications, i.e., SPF and DKIM. It is designed to simplify the handling of
these specifications, and eventually to promote the use of them. There are also other
known methods that store some data in TXT RRs such as OE, which uses DNS as a
means to distribute public keys for different purposes [78].
DNS Tunneling
The concept of using DNS for data transfer is introduced by Dan Kaminsky [53]. He
demonstrates the feasibility to use DNS queries to exfiltrate data, and DNS response
packets to receive data. As seen Figure 2.2, tunneling queries and responses are long
due to the embedded data. In the query, the data is added as a sub-domain label,
and it might be multiple labels due to the restriction in the length of labels. The RR
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type can be TXT, CNAME, or NULL. However, it is often TXT because CNAME
is more limited in terms of syntax format, and NULL might be dropped by some
DNS resolvers. Both outgoing and incoming data is encoded with Base64. However,
there is no restriction in the encoding scheme as long as it uses a suitable alphabet
for DNS [63].
 DNS Ƌueƌy: 







Figure 2.2: DNS Tunneling Query and Response
DNS tunneling can be used to bypass restricted networks, such as commercial
WiFi hotspots. These networks allow all DNS traffic. However, they require authen-
tication to connect to the Internet. In this context, DNS is used as a carrier for other
protocols by embedding outbound and inbound traffic into query and response mes-
sages respectively. The possibility of having free Internet connection grabs attentions,
and then several open-source DNS tunneling tools are developed [61].
In a normal scenario, there are two key players in a DNS tunnel; a host and a
remote server as seen in Figure 2.3. The server and the host can be any computer
that has access to the Internet. Once these machines are ready, a DNS tunnel user
has to have control over the zone file of a domain. A domain name is required to
orchestrate the traffic, and it can easily be obtained for free by using dynamic DNS
providers (e.g., http://freedns.afraid.org). The user has to set an NS record, which
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points to his remote server (ns.dnstunnel.com). Therefore, any DNS query to that
domain will reach to the name server of that domain. The remaining part of the
setup is that the user has to set up one of the existing DNS tunneling tools on both
the host and the remote server. The host script will encode the data and create DNS
queries to the domain in question (dnstunnel.com). The remote server decodes the
data, and replies with the demanded response. In Figure 2.3, the remote server plays
a proxy role between the user and the Internet.
Figure 2.3: DNS Tunneling
The feasibility of using DNS RRs to distribute payload has been proven by the
DNS tunneling technique, which shows that DNS can be used for transmitting any
type of information after simple encoding operations. However, there are some lim-
itations due to the low data transmission rate through RRs. DNS response packets
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are limited to 512 bytes if Extension Mechanisms for DNS (EDNS) is not used [85].
EDNS is an extension mechanism for DNS to enhance the protocol based on the in-
creasing capacity of network systems, which increases the DNS packet size up to 4096
bytes. However, some firewalls might not accept DNS responses that are larger than
the default 512 bytes. This potential drawback forces botmasters to find stable ways
to utilize DNS for payload distribution channels.
2.1.2 Passive DNS
Passive DNS is a technique to replicate the global DNS activities in order to investi-
gate it in near real-time. Florian Weimer introduces the first pDNS data collection
mechanism [87]. In his proposal, the initial aim is to fix the inconsistency between A
and PTR records. PTR records are used for reversed lookup to find out the domain
name of a given IP address. Therefore, the mappings between IP addresses and do-
main names require constant updating due to dynamic IP addresses. Therefore, DNS
can be replicated, and it can be used as a historical database to run such reversed
queries as well as to gain other intelligence on domain names. There are several im-
plementations of such pDNS replicating systems including the Security Information
Exchange (SIE) initiative provided by Farsight Security, Inc. [1]
The Security Information Exchange (SIE) Initiative
Passive DNS in SIE is generally believed to be the most established implementation
of Weimer’s proposal. It has a distributed architecture to deploy replicating sensors
all around the globe, and build a central information center [26, 30]. The system is



















Figure 2.4: Passive DNS Channels in SIE
in different networks. These sensors duplicate the traffic passing through these name
servers, and upload the data to a central processing pipeline.
As seen in Figure 2.4, pDNS replicating sensors upload captured query and re-
sponse DNS packets to the infrastructure of SIE. These channels are actually Virtual
Local Area Network (VLAN) connections, which can be accessed for different pur-
poses. Initial uploads from sensors are sent to the channel 202, which outputs the
raw data. If a packet is missing response, or there is only response; it is discarded,
and sent to channel 206. From channel 202 to 204, repeating RRs are combined into
a single RR by de-duplication and re-de-duplication processes. Also, some filtering
and blacklisting are applied to remove the artifacts of cache poisoning attacks [30].
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2.2 Related Work
In this section, we first discuss existing works on the detection and mitigation of DNS
abuses in two folds: protocol-level and system-level. Afterwards, we focus on recent
research efforts in terms of establishing and analyzing pDNS to detect existing and
emerging security threats.
2.2.1 DNS Abuses
DNS is often targeted by malicious networks for different purposes. It can be either
hijacking a victim’s web request, or establishing a resilient network with multiple
layers of proxies. In any case, DNS is abused by botmasters to accomplish their
malicious goals. Based on the nature of abuses, they can be categorized as protocol-
level and system-level as seen in Figure 2.5. In the following sections, we will present
an overview of the research works on detection and mitigation of DNS abuses at
different levels.
Protocol-level Abuses
The naive architecture of the DNS protocol allows botmasters to use it to establish
covert communication channels or fast-flux networks by simple tweaks within the
protocol. These abuses show that the DNS protocol allows attackers to transfer
information in DNS query and response packets [29, 65, 76] or to create malicious
networks by pointing thousands of compromised machines with a single domain [20,
49, 66].
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Figure 2.5: The Placement of Our Work in the Literature
DNS Tunneling: The use of DNS as a communication medium for payload distri-
bution is relatively new and research activities on this topic are limited. Although,
these studies are scattered, they can be roughly grouped under two categories: ma-
licious attack payload distribution channels in the DNS protocol, and the DNS tun-
neling.
Dietrich et al. [29] first discuss the existence of botnets that tunnel C&C commu-
nication channels through DNS. They discovered a malware family, which is named
Feederbot, that exfiltrates data within DNS query sub-domain labels, and infiltrates
attack payloads in DNS response packets. Their detection method introduces ex-
traction of several features from the response data. While their work shows promis-
ing results, it is limited to the detection of aggressive DNS tunnels for C&C chan-
nels. Some malware families use more resilient methods for receiving attack payloads
through DNS rather than the DNS tunneling [65]. Also, their work focuses on the
assumption that there will be a certain degree of traffic, while our analysis shows that
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some families use DNS to receive a very limited amount of payload, e.g., the Morto
malware family [65]. Moreover, we find that malware might not receive Base32 or
Base64 encoded payload, rather clear text in TXT records. Xu et al. [19, 3] introduce
a resilient mechanism for bots to create covert channels through DNS for C&C com-
munications. They design a stealthy C&C architecture that supports two different
modes. The Codeword mode creates a uni-directional communication channel that
pulls the attack payload. The tunneled mode creates a bi-directional communication
channel between bots and the C&C server. They also mention some techniques to
increase the stealthiness of these channels to make them virtually undetectable from
the compromised host’s perspective. In fact, during our analysis in pDNS and mal-
ware datasets, we find that their proposed methods are already used by some malware
families such as Feederbot, Morto [29, 65]. While their technique can easily defeat
the host-based detection mechanisms, we are able to detect these malicious channels
in the pDNS traffic. We also found that malware families, which use bi-directional
channels, are often detected easily due to their extensive traffic. Similarly, Raman et
al. [76] propose a network penetration technique that uses the DNS tunneling to infil-
trate the attack payload. Their method is based on establishing a tunnel by an exploit
code. Our system can detect the payload distribution channel in pDNS regardless of
the format of the payload, as we do not inspect the content of DNS messages. Also,
there is an ongoing effort from IETF in preventing name servers being abused by
botmasters for attack payload distribution [44].
DNS tunneling has gained a growing interest in the academia, as it offers a wide-
range of opportunities to establish covert channels in DNS. So far, it has been stud-
ied from different perspectives, such as security, feasibility and performance. Dusˇan
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Berna´t [11] formalizes the use of DNS as a communication medium by modeling a
storage-like read/write mechanism in the protocol. The studies in DNS tunneling
also focus on the detection of such covert channels in network traffic. Especially af-
ter development of several DNS tunneling tools, researchers have emerged to design
detection techniques for the traffic of these tools. There are some proposed methods
for detecting DNS tunneling within a network by using n-gram analysis [16, 17, 75].
They present promising results in terms of detecting the tunnels. However, malicious
payload distribution channels often do not have extensive upstream data; thus they
do not show this characteristic feature of DNS tunneling tools. Therefore, any string
based analysis on the queries might not reveal enough differences between regular and
malicious queries to detect these channels. Also, our system detects payload distri-
bution channels regardless of the syntax by using DNS zone activities (Section 3.3.3).
Greg Farnham [33] discusses existing open-source DNS tunneling implementations,
and proposes a mechanism for the detection of these tools. This mechanism is mainly
based on using a set of rules for Intrusion Detection Systems (IDSs). Although IDSs
are effective for capturing malicious data streams in network traffic, signature-based
systems are often prone to false positives [81]. Several studies [4, 61, 84] analyze
existing DNS tunneling tools from the performance perspective, as DNS tunneling
often raises concerns on the limitation of DNS packet sizes. They conclude that these
tools create a significant overhead in the network traffic . Finally, Ellens et al. [31]
apply network flow analysis methods on DNS tunnels to detect them accurately within
the network boundaries. It shows that DNS tunnels can be investigated like any other
network-based covert channel. However, it is important to mention that this work
and the proposals reported in [16, 17, 75] are limited to the detection of tunnels within
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a given network, whereas we detect such channels in the global DNS traffic without
limiting it to a single network.
Kenton Born [14] investigates the possibility of establishing covert channels in DNS
by using web browsers. He shows that such channels can easily be initiated with web
browsers’ privileges, and any type of data can be exfiltrated without alerting IDSs.
The author also investigates [15] the possibility of piggy-backing existing DNS packets
without altering the packet structure. It is an alternative DNS tunnel as opposed to
traditional DNS tunneling implementations [61]. There are several studies on building
a covert channel by manipulating DNS query and response packets [18, 67]. They
discuss sending and receiving data through DNS query and response packets in the
traditional DNS tunneling paradigm (Section 2.1.1). Paxson et al. [69] propose a
comprehensive solution for the detection of covert channels in DNS. The proposed
solution is based on the possibility of the existence of different types of covert channels
in DNS. For example, bots can exfiltrate boolean data by using predetermined values
in DNS query sub-domains, or by timing the queries in a predetermined pattern.
While the study shows promising results in live and pDNS datasets, it can be a
complementary solution to our proposal as our work does not rely on the packet
content.
Fast-flux Networks: Fast-flux networks are established by returning a different
set of IP addresses for each DNS query, therefore same domain name is mapped to
an extensive number of IP addresses. This approach makes it difficult to detect the
machine behind that domain name. Botnets are increasingly adapting malicious flux
networks because it gives them the freedom of establishing a protective layer in front
of C&C servers [80]. The detection of these servers has become more complex, and
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even if they are detected, most of the time botmasters reach their goals before domain
take-downs. There are several studies [20, 49, 66, 68, 71] in the field of analysis and
detection of malicious flux networks. Their methods are based on characteristics of
these networks, and they use certain features, e.g., the diversity of IP addresses and
name server records. Perdisci et al. [70] analyze fast-flux networks in pDNS, and as
opposed to the previously proposed methods [49, 66, 68], they focus on the detection
of such networks without limiting it to domains that are found in spam emails.
System-level Abuses
DNS is a simple yet powerful system that consists of globally deployed name servers.
Every transaction in the Internet is initiated with a DNS lookup, therefore botmasters
try to exploit every possible point in the whole system. Recent studies show that
there are still unknown vulnerabilities almost at every layer of the system. The
authors of [6, 24, 25, 52] study cache manipulation attacks on caching DNS in the
DNS hierarchy. Antonakakis et al. [6] propose a system, namely Anax, for scanning
caching resolvers to detect possible cache poisoning attacks. This system is built
on top of the system, which is introduced in [24]. As opposed to this work, Jiang
et al. [52] introduce an uncovered vulnerability in DNS, which allows botmasters
to keep previously deleted domains alive. Although this vulnerability falls in cache
manipulation type of abuses, it highlights a serious architectural issue in the current
implementation of DNS. According to the attack definition, an attacker can get a
domain resolved by an authoritative name server, which the attacker controls, and
keep the cache alive in targeted open resolvers.
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Dagon et al. [25] propose a novel method to resist against cache poisoning by
forcing caching resolvers to use mixed case encoding. Therefore, an attacker needs
to guess the encoding to find the cached data, and update it with malicious response
data. Even though the method seems to be efficient, the length of domain names
play an important role in terms of entropy. Domains with short names are likely to
be guessed easier than domains with longer names. Moreover, domain names, which
are composed of only numbers (e.g., 123.com), cannot be encoded with mixed cases.
Dagon et al. [27] investigate rogue resolvers, which resolve domains to malicious IP
addresses. Compared to cache poisoning attacks, this type of attacks target stub
resolvers rather than caching resolvers. In other words, DNS settings on a host
machine are altered to use rogue resolvers to delegate DNS queries. Therefore, these
resolvers map legitimate domains to phishing campaigns.
Studies on DNS based botnet detection show that newly registered malicious
domains have different characteristics compared to a regular domain [7, 12, 21, 46].
For instance, newly registered malicious domains tend to resolve within a certain
IP range, which is often in the control of botmasters [46]. One study [12] shows
that the lifetime of a malicious domain is very short, because botmasters often use
certain domains for dedicated campaigns. In [8, 12], the authors introduce techniques,
which are deployable to the top level name servers, to detect malicious domains in
the backbone layer of DNS. However, the positioning of the detection system is weak
in terms of correlating attacks through multiple networks. Antonakakis et al. [7]
observe domains for malicious activities in authoritative name servers. While this
method remains more fine-grained compared to [8, 12], the detection mechanism can
only detect domains that have similarity to previously seen domains. Choi et al. [21]
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propose an algorithm to detect the botnet activities based on DNS queries. They
target the similarity of queries of bots from the same botnet. Although they are
focusing on query similarities, our work focuses on query and response patterns as
well as the DNS zone activities.
Another emerging system-level abuse of DNS is Domain Generation Algorithm
(DGA) based domains, which are randomly generated and queried by bots with the
hope of finding the registered domain. Botmasters also generate the same set of
domains concurrently, and register one of them. In this way, law enforcements and
other security organizations have difficulty to find malicious domains among thou-
sands of newly generated domains per day. This approach is also known as domain
fluxing [83]. There are several studies [9, 83, 90] introduce methods for the detection
of botnets, which use domain fluxing. Stone-Gross et al. [83] report the existence of
such malicious technique, specifically by a malware family Torpig. Interestingly, Tor-
pig uses Twitter as the source of randomness for generating random domain names.
On the other hand, [9, 90] consider the fact that bots receive a large amount of NX-
DOMAIN (Non-Existent Domain) responses, because randomly generated domains
are not registered most of the time. NXDOMAIN response is returned when the
domain in question does not exist. Yadav et al. [90] test their method with an off-
line datasets, whereas [9] deploy their system, namely Pleiades, in live traffic from
two major Internet Service Providers (ISPs). Both systems show promising results
with high accuracy in the detection of such botnets. However, [9] do not rely on any
blacklists or predefined structure from any botnet, therefore it could detect previously
unknown botnets.
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2.2.2 Passive DNS Analysis
Passive DNS is definitely important for DNS related studies. So far, the number of
studies, which use pDNS as a data source, has been increasing, and it seems that
pDNS will become one of the de-facto data sources for threat analysis.
There are studies in using pDNS for detecting malicious activities in near real
time [23, 26, 28, 58, 59, 60, 92]. All of these studies discuss the effectiveness of
utilizing replicated DNS traffic for understanding the attack methodologies used by
botmasters. Marchal et al. [59] introduce a framework, namely DNSSM, to build
domain-based analysis by using DNS responses. From data capturing perspective,
it uses Weimer’s technique [87] as explained in Section 2.1.2. The system mirrors
the live DNS traffic by capturing query and response packets in a recursive resolver.
On contrary to the common practice, the authors designed their framework to store
domain-based features, e.g., number of IP addresses, and TTL values. In common
practice, DNS data would be stored as it is captured, and it would allow researchers
to use the captured data for different types of analysis. In our pDNS database (Chap-
ter 4), we rather follow the common approach. The authors use ten features to detect
malicious activities, including a feature to pinpoint approximate geographic location
of physical machines. Marchal et al. [60] design an architecture for the actual imple-
mentation of the pDNS analysis framework [59], that they have introduced. Because
analyzing such intense data source requires distributed storage and computation, the
authors utilize Apache Hadoop1 and Apache Cassandra2. As a proof of concept, they




of features, which were introduced in [59], are accurate in detection of certain types
of DNS anomalies.
Marcha et al. [58] propose an approach to analyze pDNS in a semantic-aware man-
ner. The approach involves using natural language processing methods to determine
the potential of a domain to be malicious. The authors ascertain models of mali-
cious domain names by determining potential keywords, which are used in phishing
domain names. Phishing domains are often composed with eye-catching keywords,
such as, pharmacy, paypal, and ebay. It is also important to mention that the system
is scalable, even with the pDNS data from big ISPs.
Paul Vixie and Jun Murai [86] discuss the design and implementation process of
one of the biggest pDNS deployments, SIE from Farsight Security, Inc. [1] Because
SIE has deployed sensors in or near recursive name servers in the US and Europe,
it requires a scalable architecture. One of the key elements of the architecture is to
provide different channel outputs, which allow researchers easily investigate various
security problem without putting extra effort for data processing. For example, one
channel allows to analyze the raw DNS data, which comes right from the name servers,
and another channel provides data, which have been sanitized from cache poisoning
attacks. Similarly, Luciana Costa and Roberta D’Amico [23] introduce an architecture
for the pDNS replication. However, their solution is not distributed, rather part of
a security intelligence project for a local ISP. Zdrnja et al. [92] discuss building a
security intelligence platform by monitoring DNS passively. Although their approach
is similar to previous solutions, their evaluation is limited to a university network.
From scalability perspective, their approach remains rather naive because it is limited
to a network, and requires improvement in terms of the scalability.
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Finally, Deri et al. [28] introduce a unique method to the pDNS analysis. Their
system observes domains for existing and emerging economical trends within the
authoritative zone of the Country Code Top-Level Domain (ccTLD) registrar of Italy,
which is responsible of .it TLD. The system is deployed in the name servers of
this registrar, and logs the DNS traffic passing through these servers. These logs
are analyzed to detect trends in domain names, and the results of the analysis are
reported to a central data store. However, the system lacks the intelligence on Italian
domains, which use other TLD, i.e., .com, .org. Also, the work is limited to the
analysis of domain names, and it requires a semantic-aware analysis of the actual
content of the websites.
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Chapter 3
Malicious Payload Distribution Channels
in DNS
3.1 Introduction
A common approach to bypass network defense borders is by tunneling the commu-
nication through existing protocols. Such tunneling can effectively defeat traditional
firewalls and IDSs. Botmasters also often prefer tunneling to keep their communica-
tions under the radar. In the early stages of botnets, botmasters mostly used IRC
channels (e.g., Agobot [48]) to operate and control their activities. The advancement
of newer protocols (e.g., instant messaging, P2P, and HTTP) largely outdated the
use of IRC channels [2]; see e.g., Zeus [32] (HTTP based), Storm [50] (P2P based).
As a natural extension to exploiting common protocols for tunneling, DNS comes
into play due to its wide availability. DNS is a query and response protocol, which
responds to each query with the corresponding pre-defined RR. The simple but ro-
bust architecture of DNS attracts botnets to abuse the system for different malicious
activities [9, 25, 27, 29].
In 2004, Dan Kaminsky [53] demonstrated the feasibility to bypass restricted
networks that allow all DNS traffic, such as commercial WiFi hotspots, that require
authentication to connect to the Internet. In this context, DNS is used as a carrier for
other protocols by embedding outbound and inbound traffic into query and response
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messages respectively. Since then, DNS tunneling has been used to design several
application tools [61], which operate covert channels through the public DNS infras-
tructure. Moreover, these tunnels can be established by using free DNS providers,
which are already known to be abused for different types of malicious activities [10].
In RSA 2012, Skoudis [82] mentions an information theft case, which is carried out
by a malware family using the DNS protocol to exfiltrate information.
Botmasters take advantage of DNS tunneling to conduct malicious activities such
as C&C or payload distribution. In payload distribution channels, for instance, bot-
masters use DNS query and response packets to carry out malicious instructions and
payload updates to individual bots. Recently, a few malware families have been iden-
tified as using the DNS protocol to hide their communications, including Morto [65],
Katusha [2], and Feederbot [29].
Due to the inherent nature of DNS, it is quite inefficient as a payload distribution
channel compared to other protocols, which botmasters often use [84]. However, DNS
infrastructures still have been abused by a few botnet families in the recent past. Such
examples indicate that botmasters are willing to exploit DNS as an attack channel
due to its wide availability. Previous works on DNS abuses [29] mainly focused on
specific botnets, and DNS abuses have not been comprehensively studied as compared
to e.g., P2P botnets [50].
In this work, we propose a detection mechanism for DNS payload distribution
channels by leveraging some inherent features of DNS as used by malicious and non-
malicious domains. We use this mechanism to analyze a significant amount of DNS
traffic to understand the extent of DNS abuses in the wild. We have detected few
previously unknown long-lasting malware domains and different types of payload
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distribution channels. Considering the fact that DNS is vulnerable to such attacks,
our system puts the defense line one step ahead of the botmasters. Moreover, our
proposed technique, which is based on the analysis of RRs, shows promising results
regardless of syntax format of payload distribution channels.
The main contributions of this work are as follows:
• Thorough analysis of malicious payload distribution channels: We
present an analysis of these channels with 1-year malware dataset covering Jan.-
Dec. 2012.
• Characterization of DNS messages: We find that malicious networks used
different techniques for distributing attack payloads, including an indexed query
pattern to distribute the attack payloads in multiple parts. We introduce a
technique to determine channel patterns, and discuss the feasibility of each
pattern. We find that most of the malware instances are using a resilient pattern
to retrieve the attack payloads.
• Detection of payload distribution channels using the pDNS traffic: We
propose a method to detect payload distribution channels based on the analysis
of resource record activities, and determine the intensity of the distribution by
using a fuzzy set theory.
• Evaluation of the system in the pDNS traffic: We experiment our system




In this section, we outline key differences between DNS tunneling and payload distri-
bution channels. Then, we discuss the use of these channels both for legitimate and
malicious purposes.
3.2.1 Payload Distribution via the DNS Hierarchy
Recently, DNS has become a target to distribute malicious payloads for two main
reasons. First, DNS traffic is often allowed to pass without inspection in corporate
networks, as it is considered to be a core element of the Internet activities. Second,
the DNS protocol has some fields that are defined to be more flexible, which opens
the doors for other unintended uses. Malicious payload can be stored in different RRs
(e.g., NULL, TXT, or CNAME). The payload data can be cached in DNS resolvers,
and they can be accessed even if C&C servers are down. Also, the labels within
the RRs name can be used to store Base32 encoded data. Request for Comments
(RFC) 1464 paves the way for payload distribution by opening the possibility of
storing arbitrary information within DNS messages [79]. However, it recommends to
store key-value pairs to share some operational data between servers. The feasibility
of using DNS RRs to distribute payload has been proven by the DNS tunneling
technique, which shows that DNS can be used for transmitting any type of information
after simple encoding operations. However, botmasters face some limitations due to
the low data transmission rate through RRs. In general, payload distribution channels
are established in the same way as DNS tunnels are established [84].
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3.2.2 Use Cases of Payload Distribution
Payload distribution through DNS is relatively a new concept, and it has very limited
number of legitimate uses. Some organizations have been inspired by the evolution
of DNS tunneling, and started to use DNS as a means to channel a part of their
operational data to enhance their systems.
Legitimate Use Cases: In 2007, Trend-Micro Inc. proposed a method to distribute
malicious code signature updates through the DNS protocol [57]. The intention of this
technique is to feed anti-virus client software with signature updates through DNS,
as an alternative update mechanism. The signature updates are divided into several
chunks, which can be identified by an identifier number. These pieces are encoded
with Base64, and assigned to the zone file as TXT RRs of a specific domain name.
When the client needs an update of a malicious code signature, it sends a query
with an identifier number of the signature as the FQDN label. Then, the server
responds with the corresponding anti-virus signature in TXT records. In general,
each signature update can span over many TXT records, which makes the client
generate many queries to retrieve the whole pieces of the update. Finally, the client
combines all TXT records, and then forms the actual update of the malicious code
signature.
In 2009, Devicescape Software Inc. introduced a system for public hotspot au-
thentication systems for mobile devices [45]. In their model, there are public WiFi
hotspots, which are placed across many places such as coffee shops, and restau-
rants. The authentication system for these hotspots is managed through a centralized
scheme. The DNS protocol is used as a channel to transfer authentication parameters
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between mobile devices and a credential server. The client software prepares a DNS
query, which consists of six sub-domain labels to carry different parameters, e.g., the
Media Access Control (MAC) address of the client’s machine. When the name server
receives the query, it forwards the parameters embedded in these labels to the back-
end credential server. Based on these parameters, the credential server prepares the
corresponding authentication response to be transported back to the client. Finally,
the client verifies the response, and then submits it to the authentication server in
the local hotspot network.
Malicious Use Cases: The crucial component of any malicious network is the com-
munication method, which should be resilient and efficient. Recently, DNS has been
used by malicious networks for updating bots with recent payload data (i.e., module
updates, command instruction). In 2011, Dietrich et al. [29] reverse engineered the
Feederbot botnet, which uses DNS as a C&C channel. Another example of the abuse
of the DNS protocol is the Morto worm, which uses DNS TXT records to transmit a
single piece of information. The embedded information is a Uniform Resource locator
(URL) that points to the real attack payload, as explained by Symantec in [65].
3.3 System Description
3.3.1 Overview
Our system monitors DNS queries and responses in pDNS, and detects payload distri-
bution channels established within DNS messages. As shown in Figure 3.1, the system
consists of two main modules: query and response pattern and payload distribution
detection modules. Initially, the system divides the captured DNS traffic stream into
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epochs E = {e1, e2, · · · , em} (e.g. epoch = 1 day). For each epoch, it aggregates the
DNS queries and responses of a given domain name d. These collected messages are
sent to the query and response pattern analysis module, which determines the channel
pattern. Then, the collected messages are sent to the payload distribution detection
module which pulls all the DNS RR activities of the domain from the pDNS database.
This module finally determines the intensity of the payload distribution based on the
zone activities. We also introduce two filtering mechanisms because some legitimate
domains might resemble payload distribution channels. In the following two sections,
we show how these modules interact to characterize, and detect payload distribution























Figure 3.1: System Overview
3.3.2 Query and Response Patterns
The DNS protocol is based on query and response messages, which are used to find
IP addresses of domains. A query from any client can be formed to retrieve different
information from a name server, which will respond accordingly. By observing the
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communication between client and server, we can model the relation between query
and response messages. The query and response relations can be used to distinguish
between different behaviors of payload distribution channels. When we observe any
payload distribution activity, we have three parameters which are used to establish
the channels in DNS. These parameters are the 2LD, sub-domain, and TXT record.
The 2LD is the domain name, which is used to orchestrate the payload distribution
activity. The sub-domain is used to transfer any information from a client to a server.
The TXT record is the response information from the server to the client. During
any session, the client and the server agree on a specific domain name to be used for
the payload distribution activity. So, the 2LD parameter is determined before any
session. Now, we are left with two parameters that are used to form the communi-
cation channel. Based on the nature of the payload distribution channel, these two
parameters have different behaviors. The aim of query and response pattern analysis
module is to differentiate between different behaviors of payload distribution. To
achieve this goal, we analyze the exchange behavior of query and response messages.
This module is built based on two observations:
Observation 1 Payload distribution channels through DNS are forced to transfer
small quantities of information with each DNS message, because DNS response packets
are limited to 512 bytes of characters if EDNS is not used (see Section 2.1.1).
Observation 2 When transferring more information through DNS protocol, it results
a significant amount of DNS queries and responses between the client and the name
server (see Section 2.1.1).
Figure 3.2 shows four possible payload distribution scenarios, which are based
on the relation between sub-domains and TXT records. Figure 3.2a explains how
33
the client changes the sub-domains to send data to the name server, which responds
with the corresponding TXT records for each sub-domain (Many-to-Many relation).
Figure 3.2b shows how the client changes the sub-domains to update the name server
about its status, and the server replies with the same TXT record for all possible
sub-domains (Many-to-Single relation). Figure 3.2c explains how the client sends the
same sub-domain that is answered with several TXT records from the server (Single-
to-Many relation). This case rarely occurs within a small period of time, because
these responses are stored by caching resolvers for a period of time (see Section 2.1.1).
Figure 3.2d shows how the client sends the same sub-domain, which is answered by


























Figure 3.2: Query and Response Exchange Patterns (d:2LD, s:sub-domain, t:TXT records)
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Definition 1 The query and response pattern model is a tuple G = 〈(D∪T ∪S), E〉,
where:
• D = {d1, d2, · · · , dn} is a finite set of domain name nodes,
• S = {s1, s2, · · · , sm} is a finite set of sub-domain nodes,
• T = {t1, t2, · · · , tk} is a finite set of TXT record nodes,
• E ⊆ (D × S) ∪ (S × T ) is a finite set of pairs of distinct nodes, called edges.
We model the query and response relationship for each domain using a directed
graph as captured by Definition 1. For each vertex v in G, we define two functions:
the in-degree of v, which is denoted by inD(v), returns the number of entering edges
to the node v: inD(v) = |{u ∈ V | (u, v) ∈ E}|, and the out-degree of v, which is
denoted by outD(v), returns the number of leaving edges from the node v: outD(v) =
|{u ∈ V | (v, u) ∈ E}|.
As shown in Figure 3.2, the query and response patterns share some properties as
given by Property 1.
Property 1 inD(D) = 0, outD(T ) = 0, outD(D) = inD(S), outD(S) = inD(T )
In order to distinguish between the patterns shown in Figure 3.2, we determine
the distance between two integer values, which might be cardinalities of any given






Since the query and response patterns can form complex relationships, we extract
the commonly used pattern. When we compare between the degree values of two
nodes, we extract the strong node candidate from each targeted set. In our case,
we select the node, which has the largest degree value, since it reflects the common
pattern behavior. Each query and response pattern can be recognized by the following
properties:
Property 2 Given that t ∈ T and inD(t) is the largest value in inD(T ), then Many-
to-Many pattern holds when outD(D) is not close to inD(t) and |S| is equal to |T |.
Property 3 Given that t ∈ T and inD(t) is the largest value in inD(T ), then Many-
to-Single pattern holds when outD(D) is close to inD(t) and |S| is equal to |T |.
Property 4 Given that t ∈ T and inD(t) is the largest value in inD(T ) and s ∈ S
and outD(s) is the largest value in outD(S) then Single-to-Many pattern holds when,
outD(s) is not close to inD(t) and |S| is equal to |T |.
Property 5 Given that t ∈ T and s ∈ S, then Single-to-Single pattern holds when,
outD(s) is close to inD(t) and |S| is equal to |T |.
Algorithm 1 shows an overview of the query and response pattern recognition in
four steps. Step 1 (Line 1 in the algorithm) is taking a snapshot from the pDNS
channel for a pre-defined window of time. This step produces a set of query and
response messages for each domain that appears within the targeted window. Step
2 (Line 3 in the algorithm) is processing every domain name by constructing the
relation graph between sub-domains and TXT records. Step 3 (Lines 4-8 in the
algorithm) is calculating the out-degree vector for all sub-domains, in-degree vector
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for all TXT records, and the out-degree of the domain. From these vectors, we get
the largest degree, which is considered as a strong representative for the relation
between sub-domains and TXT records. Step 4 (Lines 9-10 in the algorithm) counts
the distinct values of sub-domains and TXT records. Step 5 (Lines 12-23 in the
algorithm) determines the pattern mode based on the properties of each pattern.
The order of the properties in if statements are arbitrary.
Algorithm 1: ExtractQueryResponsePattern
Input: A domain name d, set of sub-domains S = 〈s1, s2, . . . , sn〉, set of TXT
records T = 〈t1, t2, . . . , tm〉
Output: Query and Response pattern mode,
{Many Many,Many Single, Single Single}
1 D ← getSnapshoptFrom pDNS(w)
2 foreach Domain d do
3 G← Create Relation Graph(d, S, T )
4 SubDomain Degree←Max(outD(S))
5 TXT Degree←Max(inD(T ))
6 Domain Degree←Max(outD(D))
7 SubDomains Counter ← |S|
8 TXT Counter ← |T |
9 Pattern Mode = None
10 if Property 5 then
11 Pattern Mode = Single Single
12 else
13 if Property 2 then
14 Pattern Mode = Many Many
15 else
16 if Property 3 then
17 Pattern Mode = Many Single
18 else
19 if Property 4 then
20 Pattern Mode = Single Many
21 return Pattern Mode
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3.3.3 Payload Distribution Detection
DNS Zone Analysis
Name servers play the main role during the lifetime of any DNS query. These servers
are capable of handling any DNS query and returning the corresponding responses,
which are taken from a zone file. In Section 3.3.2, we have seen four different methods,
that are used to distribute data through DNS. Because name servers are key players
in DNS, malicious networks need to have access to a name server for managing the
payload distribution. After the name server is configured to be authoritative for the
malicious domain name, botmasters prepare the zone file of the domain to hold all
attack payloads for the delivery through DNS.
In DNS zone analysis module, we analyze the behavior of domain names by ob-
serving DNS zone files. Within the zone file of each domain name, there are different
types of RRs. Each RR indicates specific services or operations associated with the
domain name. One of the powerful features of the pDNS database is the aggrega-
tion of how many times each record has been requested, called access count (ac). In
general, domain names, which are solely used for payload distribution, show different
behavior compared to regular domains. Regular domains receive queries for different
RRs. On the other hand, malicious domain names, which are only used for payload
distribution through DNS, are only accessed to receive attack payloads. Therefore,
they only focus on using specific RRs that are known to be used in payload distribu-
tion channels such as TXT records. Moreover, these domains do not heavily use the
RRs that are normally used by regular domain names, such as A, AAAA, and MX
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resource records. By observing the RRs and their access counts, we can profile the
DNS zone activities of a domain name.
Extraction of DNS Zones: In payload distribution channels through DNS, name
servers are considered as the payload distributors. Since domain names can have mul-
tiple zones, we must recognize the responsible zones, which are associated with pay-
load distribution. This process can be formalized as an ordered set of labels L of a 2LD
D within a period of time t, where the leftmost label represents the lowest zone within
the DNS hierarchy. Dt = {L1, L2, . . . , Lm}, Li = {label1, label2, . . . , labeln−1, labeln},
where 1 ≤ i ≤ n, and m is the number of query and response packets that are
captured under that 2LD, and n is the number of labels in each query.
A query might have multiple sub-domain labels, which might point to sub-zones
under the same 2LD. In order to differentiate between a normal sub-domain and a
sub-zone, the module traverses the labels from 2LD to the leftmost label. For each
label, the NS resource record is requested to see whether that label is a sub-zone or
not. If a sub-domain label has an NS record, it is a sub-zone under that 2LD. In the
next step, the module profiles DNS zone activities of this sub-zone.
Profiling of DNS Zones: Understanding whether a sub-zone is used for payload
distribution purposes can be achieved by analyzing its RR activities. These activities
can be calculated as a function of access counts. By using the pDNS database, we
extract all accessed RRs and their access counts. PDNS is built in a way that it
counts the accesses to each RR for a certain period.
Let R = RA ∪RNS ∪ · · · ∪RTXT where RA = {rA | rA is an A record}, . . . , RNS =
{rNS | rNS is a NS record} be the set of all RR types that can be defined in a DNS
zone file, and P = {p | p ∈ (R \RNS ∪RCNAME)} is the set of all the RR types that
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are commonly used by payload distribution channels and other uses too. Since the
TXT resource record is known to be the most suitable for payload distribution, we
define a set T = {rTXT | rTXT is a TXT record} that holds any TXT record in a
given zone.
For every RR type from sets P and T , the access count is retrieved from the
pDNS database. Then, these access counts are aggregated to determine the µ value
as formulated by Equation 3.2, which reflects the relation between the access ratios









where n and m are the numbers of RRs for T and P respectively. Also acT and
acP are access counts of each element in T and P respectively.
The Equation 3.2 provides a percentage value (0 ≤ µ ≤ 1) of using TXT RR.
When a domain name receives more access to RRs from P , it has a smaller µ value
than a payload distribution channel domain that receives access only to TXT records.
Payload Distribution Intensity Analysis
Our payload distribution detection is based on DNS zone activities as described in
Section 3.3.3. The Equation 3.2 provides the rating value of a domain name being
used as payload distribution channel. However, it gives an imprecise and uncertain
information about the intensity of the payload distribution channels. From an in-
vestigator perspective, detected domain names have to be prioritized based on their
behaviors to facilitate the investigation process. When a domain name is abused,
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it is important to learn its maliciousness intensity or severity level in a descriptive
way. Fuzzy set theory can be used to transform the rating values to more descriptive
meanings by introducing the level of intensity of the payload distribution of a given
domain [91]. In Table 3.1, we have seven different levels of certainty, that are used
in the estimative probability problem [54]. In general, when we have k levels, the
parameters {p(L1), p(L1), · · · , p(Lk)} can be computed as a function of µ values in
Equation 3.2 according to fuzzy triangular membership function [91]. Let each level
Lt be a fuzzy subset, and each rating value µ is assigned to a membership grade
p(Li, µ) taking values in [0, 1], with p(Li, µ) = 0 corresponding to non-membership in
Li, 0 < p(Li, µ) < 1 to partial membership in Li, and p(Li, µ) = 1 to full membership
in Li.
Level Kent’s Estimative terms Probability
Very High (VH) Certain 100%
High (H) Almost Certain 93% (± 6%)
Medium to High (MH) Probable 75% (± 12%)
Medium (M) Chances About Even 50%(± 10%)
Low to Medium (LM) Probably Not 30%(± 10%)
Low (L) Almost Certainly Not 7%(± 5%)
Very Low (VL) Impossible 0
Table 3.1: Probability Value Scale [54]
3.4 Dataset Collection
Throughout our experiments, we utilize three datasets to analyze the problem from
different perspectives. Our datasets are a near-real time pDNS traffic, a pDNS
database, and a malware database.
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Passive DNS: In our experimental results, we evaluate the system on a one-month
dataset, which spans between March 19, 2013 and April 19, 2013. According to the
system logs, the total number of packets processed by our system is around 40 million
packets with an average of about 1.3 million packets daily (Table 3.2).
Passive DNS Database: Our system also builds a pDNS database that stores all
the data coming from the pDNS traffic. This database recorded the pDNS traffic that
we utilize for profiling the DNS zone of domains.
Malware Database: We observe over one-year period of malware samples that
are provided by a major security vendor. We receive the malware feed on a daily
basis and then analyze each sample in a controlled environment to generate dynamic
behavioral analysis reports. In our analysis, we just consider malware samples that
conduct activities using the TXT RR for the DNS protocol. Table 3.2 shows some of
the statistics about the malware feed recorded between January 2012 and December
2012.
3.5 Experimental Results
In this section, we explain the experimental results of our system. We show that our
system can detect payload distribution channels in the pDNS traffic. The experimen-
tal results reveal long-running hidden domains, which are used by Morto worm to
distribute attack payloads. We also found that on contrary to the common knowl-
edge [65], some of these attack payloads are in clear text without any encoding and
encryption. This indicates that our system can detect these channels regardless of
the format of the distributed data.
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Passive DNS Period 30 days
Number of DNS messages 20 Billion
Number of TXT records 40 Million
Malware database Period 1 Year
Number of malware samples 15 Million
Number of malware samples
that have TXT activities
18 Thousand
Table 3.2: Dataset Statistics
During experiments, we tested our system with a live pDNS traffic for 30 days
(Section 3.4). Domains that are accessed for TXT records are queued up in a time-
based window; we set the window to be one day. When the window expires, the
packets are fed to the query and response pattern module (Section 3.3.2). Once
the patterns for each domain is recognized, these packets are sent for the DNS zone
analysis (Section 3.3.3), to build the DNS zone profile for each zone. At the final
step, the information gathered on each zone is passed to the intensity analysis module
(Section 3.3.3), which uses a membership function to determine the level for each zone
to be a payload distribution channel.
We used a computer with i7-2600 3.4 GHz CPU and 16 GB of RAM. The system
performed well with near real-time analysis of the domains. The lookups to the
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pDNS database did not create a significant overhead to the overall performance of
the system.
3.5.1 Query and Response Patterns
In the first step of our system, we determine the query and response patterns on the
captured traffic within one day. To evaluate the feasibility of each pattern to carry
out payload distribution channels, Figure 3.3 compares the average distinct message
counts from pDNS with the number of malware instances per pattern. Many-to-Many
pattern can be considered as the best candidate for distributing large volume of data,
while it was probed by small number of malware instances during the year of 2012.
This extensive payload retrieval scheme would easily alert IDSs [77]. On the other
hand, Single-to-Single pattern allows to carry small volume of data while maintaining
a low network footprint. By observing our malware samples, we found that most of
the malware instances used this pattern to retrieve the attack payloads. Because each
of these instances send a single query to receive the attack payload, their queries can
easily blend in the daily network traffic. Compared to other patterns, Single-to-Single
is the best candidate to establish a fully resilient channel in DNS. Single-to-Many
pattern requires to update the zone file to distribute different resource data for the
same query. This is technically difficult to maintain because of the caching behavior
of name servers. As we see in Figure 3.3, there is no single malware instances using
this pattern. Although Many-to-Single pattern has a single response to the different
queries like Single-to-Single pattern, it creates a large number of queries, that can be









Figure 3.3: Average Number of Query and Response Messages within Single Window (1
Day)
As shown in Figure 3.3, Many-to-Many pattern is generating the most extensive
traffic compared with the other patterns. The high volume of data exchange can reveal
the name server, which is used as the payload provider. In order to hide this name
server, botmasters are using it only for the bootstrapping phase to initiate payload
distribution channels. The initial DNS query is directly made to a rogue name server
without traversing the DNS hierarchy. Therefore, the malware authors could use any
domain, even unresolvable domains. We found some instances of Feederbot botnet,
which used known legitimate domains such as yahoo.com. However this first query
is just the starting point of the payload distribution channel. In the first query, bot
sends some data in sub-domain labels that are used as a key derivation parameter [29].
The response for this query comes as encoded with Base64, yet not encrypted. In
this payload, the bot receives the domain name, that is considered to be the real
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payload distribution channel domain, and an IP address of an open resolver to be
used. The open resolver is abused for hiding the name server which provides the
payload contents. Our observation confirms that open resolvers are often subject
to different kinds of abuses [27]. After the bootstrapping process is completed, bot
starts querying this domain to receive the attack payload in a sequential manner.
Unlike what has been reported in [3], Feederbot only uses the unresolvable domains
for bootstrapping process.
3.5.2 Payload Distribution Detection
When the query and response patterns of domain names are recognized, they are
inspected by the DNS zone analysis module. The access counts of each RR of these
domain names are gathered from the pDNS database. Equation 3.2 determines the
µ values of each domain being used as payload distribution channel based on the
access counts. During our experiments on the pDNS traffic, we have captured 2707
domains that have TXT resource record activities. Figure 3.4 shows the distribution
of µ values across these domains.
To validate our system, we observe our malware dataset, and pDNS database to
investigate the difference between payload distribution channels and regular domains.
As regular domains, we use the top 500 domains from Alexa top sites1, because they
are used for different services. By using our 1-year malware dataset, we extracte
malware domains, which are used for payload distribution. We retrieve the access
counts for all RRs of each domain from regular and malware domains. These access
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Figure 3.4: Distribution of Rating Values of the Detected Domains
domain. In Figure 3.5, the distribution of the access counts for these RRs is given.
Domains from Alexa received DNS queries for different RRs. The reason for this could
be the fact that these domains utilize DNS for enabling access to different services.
On the contrary, malware domains received an extensive number of DNS queries for
TXT records. These records are used to distribute the payload as it is the most
suitable RR type within the protocol. We also investigate the access to the CNAME
records in malware domains. They are used to redirect between malicious domains
as botmasters maintain a network of malicious payload distribution channels.
When the system calculates µ values for all domains, it determines the intensity
level of payload distribution of each domain. This step of the detection is based on
the membership function, which was discussed in Section 3.3.3. The calculated µ





































Figure 3.5: Alexa and Malware Domains DNS Record Access Counts
seven different levels. As a proof of concept, we determined seven levels in compliance
with Kent’s Estimative Terms [54].
Filteration Steps: There are some of the legitimate use cases that can behave as
payload distribution channels. In fact, there are specifications that are using TXT
records to apply some security measure for mail servers such as SPF, and DKIM (see
Section 2.1.1). Since these specifications are designed for mail servers, the zone file
should reflect the existence of MX RRs. As shown in Figure 3.5, malicious domains
are not associated with any MX RRs. Therefore, these legitimate services can be
recognized using two different filtration steps: MX RR activity, and specifications
recognition.
The first filtration process takes each domain, and selects the most accessed TXT
RR by using the pDNS database. Then, we apply a regular expression in the TXT
record based on the defined syntax of specifications [5, 89] to determine any possible
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Figure 3.6: Effect of Filtration Mechanisms on the Detected Domains
specification string (e.g., SPF). In the second filtration process, we investigate the
activities of MX RRs. When a domain name is associated with any MX RR activities,
it is considered as non-payload distribution channel. In Figure 3.6, we show the
distribution of domains across different levels of intensity as well as the results of
filtration mechanisms. MX and specifications filtration mechanisms perform similar
to each other in every intensity level. Compared to the others, level 7 has the most
domains, which remained after applying both filtering mechanisms. Therefore, we
focus on level 7, which is labeled as Certain as explained in Table 3.1. In Figure 3.7,
the distinct domains that are detected as payload distribution channels are given in a
daily basis across one-month along with the performance of each filtration step. The
number of detected domains is 390 before any filtration is applied. However, some of
these domains might be accessed mainly to receive specifications related data. The
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Figure 3.7: A Daily Observation of the VH Intensity Level with the Filtration.
we confirmed that the remaining domains are valid payload distribution channels as
discussed ins Section 3.2.2.
The Resilient Morto Domains: Morto is a malware family that targets the Re-
mote Desktop Protocol (RDP) to gain access to host machines. It is one of the
malware families that use DNS as a payload distribution channel [65]. During our
experiment, we detected domains that are being used by the Morto family. Morto
uses the Single-to-Single pattern where a static query is sent to the malware domain
to receive the encoded payload. In fact, it is known that it receives a Base64 encoded
and encrypted URL, which points to the second payload [65]. We noticed that Morto
domains also distribute IP addresses in clear text inside TXT records. A reverse
lookup to one of these IP addresses in the pDNS database reveals that it is shared
with other malicious domains. In Table 3.3, we give some statistics on the domains
that are used by Morto instances. As mentioned in Section 3.5.2, the malware au-
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thors also linked different domains to each other through CNAME records to maintain
a malicious network. A simple investigation through the pDNS database reveals a
network of domain names from Morto botnet.
Number of detected Morto domains 3
Life span of these domains 1.3 years on average
Average of access counts of TXT records 4080392
Table 3.3: Statistics of Detected Morto Worm Domains
3.6 Limitations and Discussions
To the best of our knowledge, our system has several limitations. The first limitation
of our system is the inability to detect malware mimicking the DNS zone activities of
legitimate domain names. We use the fact that name servers of payload distribution
channels only receive requests for TXT records. If a domain is used for different
malicious activities (e.g., spam, phishing) as well as for payload distribution, then
it will be accessed for different RRs, e.g., A record for phishing scams. Then, our
detection method might consider this domain as non-payload distribution domain.
The second limitation is that our system relies on our observations from our mal-
ware database. The malware database is established with dynamic analysis reports,
which are generated in the sandbox for a limited time. It means that the dynamic
analysis process might not capture all DNS communications of malware families.
Therefore, we cannot know whether our system can detect all malicious payload dis-
tribution channels in DNS.
The third limitation is that our system is an oﬄine detection mechanism which
can detect after a domain is visible for an epoch. It cannot detect the payload
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distribution channels as they become online. So, the system cannot be used for real
time detection. However, it can detect them at the end of the epoch, which is one
day in our experimental setup.
The last limitation of our system comes from pDNS. Its replication [87] is a unique
way to collect the global DNS traffic by sensors. However, it has a shortcoming that
might affect our results. Malware might not use caching resolver of the network
and alternatively send the queries directly to an open resolver. In this case, the
traffic would not pass through the sensor, and would not be analyzed. While this
is a limitation of the pDNS replication mechanism, our system can detect payload
distribution channels within the range of the existing pDNS stream.
Detection Regardless of Syntax: Our results show that the system detects pay-
load distribution channels in DNS. As our method discover Morto domains: it also
detects legitimate payload distribution channels as discussed in Section 3.2.2. It indi-
cates that regardless of the syntax of the payload distribution channel, the DNS zone
activity metric is a strong feature to detect domains, which are used for these chan-
nels. If botmasters start using a syntax similar to the legitimate services to blend in
their traffic, they might not be detected by network monitors. However, our system
still detects them because it monitors the DNS zone activities of payload distribution
channels.
DNS Tunneling Detection: In the results of our experiments, we detected DNS
tunneling activities from a single domain (a DNS tunneling app for Android). As
our system is configured to monitor TXT records, it successfully detects any DNS
tunneling activities on TXT records. If the tunnel is established by using another
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RR type, we expect that our system would still detect as the detection is not based
on the content of the RR, but the access counts of RRs.
Observations from Malware Database: In our malware dataset, we discover do-
main names that are used for payload distribution channels. The behavior of these
malware samples introduced different methods to retrieve the malicious content as
discussed in Section 3.2.2. One of the interesting ways is that they used indexed
queries to receive attack payload in multiple response packets. Due to the size re-
striction on TXT RRs, the payload is chunked into parts and each part is placed in
another TXT record. Bot clients start querying this series of packets in a sequential
manner until the last packet is received. Some of these payloads are chunked up to
thousands of packets. Surprisingly, this method is very similar to the patent from
Trend Micro [57]. However, our results showed that this method is not seen in the
pDNS anymore. There are two possible interpretations of not observing this behavior
in our dataset. First, botmasters realized the significant exposure of using this be-
havior, which generates a large number of messages, then they decided to stop using
it. Second, these domain names are directly resolved by their own name servers or
other open resolvers, which are not captured by our pDNS sensors.
3.7 Conclusion
In this work, we shed some light on the abuse of the DNS protocol by malware
for distributing attack payloads. We design a system that is able to characterize
and detect the payload distribution channels within the pDNS traffic. Our system
observes the DNS zone activities of a channel by gathering access counts of each RR
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type, and determines the intensity of the payload distribution. By experimenting our
system on the pDNS traffic during one month, we show that it detects the resilient
malicious payload distribution channels, which were active more than 18 months. We
find that most of the malware instances are using a resilient pattern to retrieve the
attack payloads, because it can blend within the daily network traffic. Moreover,





This chapter describes our efforts on establishing a pDNS database. The design
of the database is influenced by DNSDB of Farsight Security Inc. [34] DNS based
analysis (for both research and investigation purposes) requires hands-on experience
with real DNS data logs. This type of studies are often done by using local network
DNS logs, however it is not enough to look at global trends in malicious activities.
It is important to analyze global DNS activities to understand and design defense
mechanisms against emerging threats, such as malicious payload distribution channels
in DNS (see Chapter 3). To achieve that, we need to have a historical database
of pDNS to correlate previous attacks with current ones to model the behaviors of
malicious communication channels as well as other security threats. Therefore, first
we will discuss the motivation behind this work. After that, we will describe the
database with its technical details. Then, we will introduce the technologies used in
this work, and the implementation details. Afterwards, the evaluation of the system
will be given. Finally, we will provide concluding remarks.
4.1 Introduction and Motivations
DNS is an important part the global Internet traffic as discussed in Section 2.1.1. More
than 250 million domains have been registered, and it is increasing every day [56].
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The increasing use of DNS makes it a good vintage point for analyzing the global
Internet use as well as emerging security threats.
Parallel to the increasing use of DNS, there is an increasing interest in DNS based
threat analysis both in the academia and the industry. There is a significant shift to
DNS for detecting global botnet trends [6, 7, 9, 12, 60]. Probably, the main reason for
this is that botmasters have started to use domains rather than numerical addresses
of their C&C servers. It is not surprising as domain names are more flexible from a
botmaster’s perspective. If a domain is taken down, it can be replaced with another
domain, and in a few hours the C&C server would be back online. So, researchers
propose techniques to observe botnets in different layers of DNS [7, 8]. This new
trend in threat analysis makes it more difficult for botmasters to hide, and maintain
their malicious networks. DNS based web application security is a new trend in the
industry. It is a technique for defending websites against different types of threats,
such as Structured Query Language (SQL) injection, DDoS, and web spammers.
This defense mechanism becomes quite strong, even against targeted attacks. In the
Spamhaus incident (see Section 1.1), Cloudflare, a web security company, deployed
their DDoS protection systems at the DNS level to mitigate the biggest DDoS attack
in the history [72]. Furthermore, Cloudflare offers other types of security measures in
the DNS level.
It is clear that DNS is a good place to investigate and mitigate emerging threats,
however it comes with some challenges. Compared to other types of threat analysis,
DNS based threat analysis requires a different approach for logging the traffic. For
example, in spam analysis, the spam data is simply captured by spamtraps [74].
It does not matter whether the spamtrap sensors are placed near the spammers’s
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geolocation. However, DNS data depends on where data capturing sensors are placed.
If the sensors are placed in a network, then the captured DNS data is limited to that
network, and it cannot be used for analyzing global trends in threats. So, sensors
should be placed in multiple networks, especially in ISP networks. Considering the
number of customers of an average ISP, capturing DNS traffic from ISPs definitely
provides a large dataset. Another challenge of DNS is the growing data size. Godaddy,
a well known web hosting company, deals with nearly 10 billion DNS queries per
day [62]. If we consider Godaddy as an ISP; when the data is aggregated from
multiple ISPs, it becomes challenging to process it.
Passive DNS comes into the play at this point. It is a strong DNS replication
method, which aims to mirror DNS traffic for further analysis. Passive DNS inher-
its the challenges of capturing DNS traffic, therefore it has to address positioning of
sensors, and an efficient solution for processing large captured datasets. It also needs
to be near real-time for detecting threats as they show up in DNS. Deploying sensors
in multiple networks, and collecting the captured data in a central data warehouse
for further processing is a good approach. It is already applied by Farsight Security,
Inc. [1] for SIE as discussed in Section 2.1.2. Their implementation includes a prepro-
cessing pipeline, which sanitizes the captured data. This initiative has many sensors
deployed in the US and Europe, and the collected DNS data is used in previous
research works [7, 12].
The motivation behind our project initially comes from the need of a pDNS
database in our work on detection of malicious payload channels in DNS. Also, there
are other on-going research work in our Computer Security Laboratory that can ben-
efit from a pDNS database. As mentioned in Section 1.3, after the completion of
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writing this dissertation, another group from our lab has started working on the de-
sign and implementation of a pDNS database, which is based on a library (mtbl) [38]
developed by Farsight Security, Inc.
Passive DNS comes as a stream of data. For analysis, it should be stored in a
database in a way that it is efficient to query, and comprehensive to keep all data
from the pDNS stream. The database also has to be scalable for distributing the load
across multiple nodes without hassle. Initially, we deployed our database on a single
node, which receives the pDNS feed. It can cope with the speed of the pDNS stream,
while serving for queries without significant latency.
As a summary, the database provides following benefits:
1. Historical database based on pDNS: The database stores selected data
from the pDNS stream in a NoSQL database system. It allows to retrieve any
type of DNS related data.
2. Scalable, efficient solution to store massive amount of DNS data:
It is based on a scalable database system, which makes the database easy to
distribute across multiple nodes, e.g., a data center. Moreover, it is efficient
enough to be used for live pDNS analysis (see Section 3.3.3).
3. Easy to access database system: We provide an API and a web interface
access to the database. While the API provides a programmatic access to the
database, the web interface gives the same functionality, which the API offers,
with a user friendly interface.
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4.2 Description
In this project, we address several requirements to accomplish for designing a fully
fledged pDNS database system.
1. Requirement 1: Easy access to the database: Interaction with the database
through programs, as well as a secure user interface.
2. Requirement 2: Efficient database schema: The database should store all
of the pDNS data in an efficient and compact way. It important to keep what
is needed to optimize the disk space usage.
3. Requirement 4: Easy to scale: Creating a cluster of database servers is
often cumbersome, and it requires complex configurations. In our case, we
cannot afford any halt in the system, because we have to process and log the
data with zero loss. The database system should handle the clustering details
without any degradation in write operations.
4. Requirement 3: Easy to maintain and cost efficient: Database systems
often require advanced optimization skills. The database should require min-
imum effort for maintenance. Also, we should find an open-source database
system for cost efficiency.
Initially, our first challenge is to analyze the pDNS stream channels, which are
described in Section 2.1.2. As each channel has advantages and disadvantages, we
need to reason our choice of channel. After choosing the right channel, we design
our database based on the format of that stream. The database schema also relies
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on the type of the database system that we have selected. In this project, we use a
NoSQL database solution from Apache Software Foundation. We explain the reason-
ing behind using a NoSQL database as opposed to Relational Database Management
Systems (RDBMSs). Finally we discuss the ways of querying the database.
Our project is to design and implement a pDNS database that can be built on top
of a pDNS stream. In a pDNS system, it is expected to have a different snapshots of
the processed DNS data, such as channels discussed in Section 2.1.2. It is important






• Cache poisoning data
The Output channel
• Sanitized data
• Access counts for RRs
• Limited time-series analysis
Table 4.1: Comparison between the Input and Output Channels
Although we might have different channels, we have to choose between input and
output channels as the remaining channels are only used to access to the internal
stages of the pDNS processing pipeline (see Figure 2.4). The input channel is the
entrance point of the pipeline, while output channel is the exit point. As seen in
Table 4.1, both channels have advantages and disadvantages. The input channel is the
first channel, and its output is raw data, which come from the capturing sensors. As
it is raw, it comes with duplications, and potentially consists of cache poisoning data,
which is the result of cache poisoning attacks on authoritative name servers. However,
it gives full flexibility to apply different approaches for building our database. As
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opposed to the processing pipeline from SIE, the final output could be more suitable
for time series analysis. On the other hand, the output channel provides sanitized
data, and as seen in Table 4.2, it provides extra information on top of existing DNS
packet information1. Every RR name is processed in a window based system, in
which every new RR name is pushed into the queue for a period. During this period,
each time an existing RR name appears, its count is incremented. In this way, access
count for each RR name is determined. However, this approach causes an inaccuracy
for time series type of analysis. It is impossible to determine when each duplicating
packet showed up in pDNS, because the timestamp information of each packet is
overwritten by the next duplicating packet. Regardless of this fact, we choose the
output channel for building our pDNS database, as the data is filtered from cache
poisoning attacks as well as bailiwick is determined [30]. Considering the size of the
pDNS data, implementing same functionalities goes beyond the scope of this project.
As the database system, we use Apache Cassandra project2, which is a well-
established open source project. It is a key-value based database system, which
is very similar to flat file data structure. This new trend in database systems is
called NoSQL, which is basically free from the complex structure of RDBMSs. The
simplicity comes from the minimalistic organization of data. Each table corresponds
to a query, which makes primary keys more important for queries. Therefore, we have
to design our database schema according to the requirements of Cassandra.
As seen in Figures A.2 and A.3 in Appendix, our database schema is grouped
under rrset and rdata. The design of these schemas are heavily influenced by the





type the type of a packet based on its state in the pipeline
count
the access count for a packet. It is calculated during the
packet’s lifetime in the processing window
time first the time when a packet is first seen
time last the time when a packet is last seen
response ip
the IP address of the authoritative name server, on which
the sensor resides
rrname the RR name of a packet
rrtype the RR type of a packet
rrclass the RR class of a packet
rrttl the TTL value a packet
rdata the response data of a packet
bailiwick the DNS zone in which the rdata is given
Table 4.2: Data Fields in the Output Channel
grouped based on the format of their primary keys. This is the fundamental part
of our database design. We consider two types of queries to our database: left-hand
and right-hand wildcard queries as seen in Table 4.3. A left-hand side wildcard query
seeks to find all RR names under a given domain, e.g., *.google.com, and a right-
hand side wildcard query gets all RR names with a certain sub-domain, e.g., news.*.
To support both query types, we have two types of primary keys in our tables. We
take the RR name and reversed it for left-hand side queries. The original RR name
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is used for right-hand side queries. Because Cassandra supports ordered keys, all
primary keys in tables are ordered. Therefore, it becomes possible to get a slice from
the table based on primary key range as seen in Table 4.3. It is important to mention
that ranging is only possible if primary keys are in hexadecimal format. In this way,
the query will be similar to getting numbers within a range, e.g., return numbers
between 154 and 189. Primary keys are also appended with extra information from
the DNS packet such as bailiwick, rrtype, and timestamp to make them unique to
avoid collision with other primary keys.
Query type Query result Primary key range
Left-hand side
*.google.com




















Table 4.3: Wildcard Queries (primary keys are in original padded format of RR names)
One of our requirements is to make the database accessible by different methods.
We provide two access methods: an API and a web interface as seen in Figure 4.1.
The first one is for querying the database directly from programs, the latter one is
to give a quick and visual access to database. The API should be easy to access, so
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we use Hypertext Transfer Protocol Secure (HTTPS) requests. The parameters of
the request provide the options for the query, and an API key authorizes the request.
The web interface is useful when investigating an incident, its user-friendly and secure








Figure 4.1: Passive DNS Database Overview
4.3 Preliminaries
The pDNS database is a combination of existing open-source tools and libraries. As
a requirement of the project, we maintain the cost-efficiency without compromising
any functionality. In this section, we discuss the tools that we utilize to build the
database. The implementation is done by using Python. It is used in for both
building and querying the database. One of the main reasons to choose Python is
the availability of the libraries for this language. Finally, we use Apache Cassandra
as our database system, which is designed for fast read and writes.
We use different libraries for reading and writing. As seen in Figure 4.2, there is
a dependency between the libraries. We use the packet format nmsg [39], which is








Figure 4.2: Libraries Used in this Project
format, so libpcap3 is required for parsing this packet format. As an improvement
over the time, Farsight Security, Inc. [1] adapted Google’s libprotobuf4 library for
transferring the data over the wire. Protocol buffers (libprotobuf) is a powerful
library, which is designed for Google’s internal communication systems. Its data
structure allows transferring data in a more compact way, which results performance
improvements compared to other libraries. Nmsg specifically relies on the C extension
of the library, which is libprotobuf-c. For de-serializing DNS packets, libwdns is
developed by Farsight Security, Inc. [42] Additionally, libnmsg depends on zlib5 and
libxs6 for decompressing and messaging purposes respectively. On top of libnmsg,
sie-nmsg library is required to parse dnsdedupe packet format. This is a specific
format for some channels in pDNS. Dnsdedupe format consists of the fields given in
Table 4.2 along with some extra operational fields. Since the implementation is in






and libnmsg respectively. To interact with our Apache Cassandra instance, we use
a client library pycassa7, which is written for Python. Finally we use web.py8 for
developing the API as well as the web interface of our pDNS database system.
Figure 4.3: Cassandra read workload comparison with HBase and MongoDB [51]
As mentioned earlier, we decide to use an open-source NoSQL database solution
for this project. NoSQL is a new phenomenon among database systems. It promotes
the use of key-value based data structures for faster writing and reading. It is sim-
ilar using a flat file based storage mechanism, which is basically writing the data in
files. As opposed to writing sequentially to the disk, NoSQL databases introduce
intelligent algorithms for handling the data in the memory prior to flushing it to the
disk. This type of memory-based operations can also be done using SQL database




Figure 4.4: Cassandra write workload comparison with HBase and MongoDB [51]
The tables are organized according to the query, as opposed to relational databases.
Therefore, there is no need for joining tables, hence faster queries. They are a better
solution for data logging mechanisms, rather than complex web applications. For ex-
ample, a social network website would require a complex relation between tables, and
achieving this with a NoSQL table might not be feasible. For our project, Cassandra
was the best option compared to other NoSQL solutions [51]. From the scalability
point of view, it scales well across multiple nodes with an increasing performance




The implementation is considered in two folds: storing the pDNS data and querying
it from the database. The process of storing the data comes with some performance
challenges. Our pDNS streams constitute tremendous amount of data per second,
and writing it to the database requires well optimized processing steps. Reading data
from the database is reasonably less challenging compared to writing to the database.
It is based on a central querying logic, which is serving to the API and the web
interface.
4.4.1 Storing the data
Our mission is to implement a mechanism, which reads from a constant stream of
data, processes it, and finally stores it into a database. We chunk our implementation
into these three steps with the same order. First, we have to implement the logic that
will be hooked on the pDNS VLAN for reading the packets, as they come from the
socket. Each nmsg packet has to be parsed with libnmsg to extract the desired fields.
After this step, we need to process these fields to fit in our data structure. It requires
using libwdns for tackling DNS data. Finally we establish connections to our database
server for writing data.
In Figure 4.5, the flow of the storing process is given. We use IO object of pynmsg
for creating a reader on the channel. This reader maintains a constant read on the
channel, and passes the input to a callback function for further processing. This part
of the implementation is straightforward. In the callback function, packets are pushed

















Figure 4.5: Flow of the Writing Process
“EXPIRATION”. This information is used when DNS packets are processed through
SIE pDNS channels. When a packet shows up in the processing pipeline, it is pushed
into a queue as “INSERTION”, which means that the packet has been seen for the
first time. Finally, when the processing window for that packet expires, it is marked
as “EXPIRATION” [30]. Therefore, this packet is the final version of that particular
query, and we store this final version in our database. In our queue, these packets are
aligned for the multi-threaded preprocessing.
During the preprocessing of packets, we extract fields from them, and prepare the
field data for writing to the database. The main load of our program comes from
this step, therefore we distribute the tasks among multiple threads. At this step,
primary keys are composed, also RR name, RR type, RR class, and RR bailiwick
data are converted from padded hexadecimal format to string by using pywdns. RR
data packets are also prepared with corresponding primary keys. Also, reversing for
primary keys is only applied to RR data with RR type NS and CNAME. These RR
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types carry their data only in FQDN format, and it enables running wildcard queries
for them. However, other RR types are not suitable for reversing their RR data. For
example, we cannot expect a wildcard query on IP addresses, which are stored in A
or AAAA RR types.
Parameter Value Purpose
initial cache size 4000
the size of the first queue, which stores
nmsg packets
write cache size 4000
the size of the second queue, which stores
preprocessed packets
flush size 50
the number of packets to be stored in mem-
ory prior to flushing to the disk
worker count 5 the number of threads for preprocessing
write sleep time 15
the number of seconds allowed Cassandra
for garbage collection
log freq seconds 30 logging frequency
Table 4.4: Configuration Parameters of the Writing Process
As seen in Figure 4.4, we use a single thread for writing to the database. The
reason of this approach is that we initially use a single node as our database server,
and we need to avoid potential locks caused by multiple write operations. After
adding more nodes to the cluster, we can have extra threads to increase the write
throughput.
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4.4.2 Querying the database
Our pDNS database provides two interfaces for querying as seen in Figure 4.1. The
API is aimed to serve to queries directly from programs, especially for automatic
accesses. To query the database, a URL must be composed of the IP address of the
web server, which runs the API and the web interface scripts, along with the query
parameters. A request to this URL should be sent through HTTPS for a secure
connection to mitigate eavesdropping. Our goal is to maintain a similar functionality
between the API and the web interface, therefore we use the same set of parameters
for the web interface. These two interfaces return the same set of data for the same
parameters without any modification in the result set.
Table 4.5 describes query parameters. These parameters are heavily influenced
from the parameters of DNSDB of Farsight Security Inc. [35] By using these parame-
ters in queries, the database can be queried with simple HTTPS requests. The result
is returned in JavaScript Object Notation (JSON) format. This object notation for-
mat is similar to XML, which allows serializing the data for passing along the wire. It
also simplifies parsing the data with native Python libraries. As seen in Figure A.4,
a simple Python code snippet can be used to query the database. The ouput is sim-
ilar to the output of the pDNS database solution (DNSDB) developed by Farsight
Security, Inc. [35, 36]
The web interface is designed to be a simple search page with security measures.
It is designed with HTML and CSS to have a user-friendly interface. Initially a
welcome page welcomes the user for logging into the system. After verifying the user
credentials, the search page is presented. It provides the same parameters, as the
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Parameter Value Purpose
search type rrset or rdata
Determines the type of the search whether
it is for RR name, or RR data.
input mode Name, IP, raw Determines the type of the keyword.
Keyword String value
Depending on keyword type, it can be a
wildcard query, a network IP space with
slash notation (e.g., 1.1.1.1/16), or raw
hexadecimal data.
rrtype A, AAA, etc.
Filters the query based on RR type of DNS
packets.
bailiwick FQDN Filters the query based on bailiwick data.
limit Positive integer value
Limits the number of results to be re-
turned, 0 returns all results.
Table 4.5: Query Parameters
API, in a search box, and the results will be presented in a table below the search
box.
4.5 Evaluation
The evaluation of our project is based on our requirements, which are the performance
of storing and querying the pDNS data. In the ideal scenario, we would expect a
similar benchmark results to Cassandra benchmark results. However, it is expected
that the processing of the pDNS data will add an extra overhead. The retrieval of the
data also requires some additional computation, which is also expected to affect the
72
benchmark results. The additional computation occurs due to the filtration of the
retrieved data. Because the database only accepts queries on primary keys, additional
filtering is applied on the retrieved data.
Node Specifications
CPU i7-2600 3.4 GHz
RAM 16 GB
OS Ubuntu 12.04 LTS
Java Oracle Java 1.7.0 45
Number of nodes 1
Project Configuration Default (see Table 4.4)
Cassandra Version 1.1.6
Cassandra partitioner org.apache.cassandra.dht.ByteOrderedPartitioner
Number of records 1M
Table 4.6: Evaluation Setup
The results of the evaluation is presented in Table 4.7. The official Cassandra
results [51] are tested on a similar node setup as seen in Table 4.6, therefore the
comparison with these results can reflect a true benchmark for the performance of our
system. As mentioned earlier, the comparison is aimed to indicate the overall overhead
of our system when the Cassandra results are subtracted. The read throughput of
our system is an expected result, because the data goes under extra processing after







Loss by Process overhead
(rows/sec)
Read 552.49 ± 23 624.31 71.82 ± 23




409.21 ± 11 467.34 58.13 ± 11
Table 4.7: Throughput of our Project with the Official Benchmark Results of Cassandra
query, therefore a throughput range occurred between different query types. The
data is filtered according to the rrtype, and this filtration occurs on the data, which
is returned from the database. The write throughput is constant as every packet from
the pDNS channel is processed in the same way before it is written to the database.
The write producess overhead due to the preparation of the pDNS data to write into
the database. Finally, we also test the system concurrent read and update operations.
For this part of the evaluation, we update existing nodes while we query the database.
The system shows 58.13 ± 11 performance overhead compared to Cassandra, which
is the result of extra processing.
The overhead, which is caused by the processing of data, is an inevitable result
of the project. As this is expected, we do not consider the processing overhead as a
limitation of the system. We rather take these measurements as indicators to optimize
the processes to decrease the overhead. Also, Cassandra can compensate the overhead
by adding more nodes to the system (see Figure 4.3 and Figure 4.4).
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4.6 Conclusion
In this chapter, we present the design and implementation of our pDNS database.
As DNS becomes a part of threat analysis more and more, pDNS is the ultimate
solution for replicating the global DNS traffic. We design a system that can match
with needs of an efficient, scalable pDNS database system, which is completely built
with open-source tools and systems. It is built on top of a pDNS data stream, and
stores all DNS data without any modification. It uses a key-value based NoSQL
database system, which is proven to handle constant read and writes, while scaling
across multiple nodes, even multiple clusters.
Although the evaluation in the testing environment shows promising results, we
have found that Cassandra has serious shortcomings. We experienced degradation
in the write process due to the internal housekeeping processes by Cassandra. As
a result of this problem, my colleagues in NCFTA has started implementing the
database using mtbl system [38] developed by Farsight Security, Inc.
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Chapter 5
Conclusion and Future Work
Botnets keep evolving, and botmasters come up with new solutions to mitigate exist-
ing defense technologies. This endless game results novel security threats, and they
are often based on vulnerabilities in software systems. In this dissertation, we have
discussed a security vulnerability, which exists in DNS. It enables data transfer by
using DNS query and response packets, which go undetected, because the DNS traf-
fic is considered to be trustworthy by network administrators. The DNS traffic is
often unmonitored, and botmasters use this advantage of the protocol to send and
receive their attack payloads. We have found different types of malicious communi-
cation channels in DNS, and introduce a novel technique to detect them regardless
of the encryption state of the traffic. During our experiments, we found that there
are several long-running domains, which are used for malicious payload distribution
networks. We also found that some payloads are sent in clear text as opposed to what
is reported by previous works. As long as this vulnerability within the DNS protocol
is not fixed, malware families will keep exploiting it increasingly to establish resilient
malicious networks.
The correlation between existing and emerging threats require a comprehensive
analysis of historical datasets. In DNS based research, the importance of pDNS is
obvious. However, pDNS comes with its own challenges in terms of the amount of the
data. Especially, when it comes to storing the data in a database for further analysis.
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In this dissertation, we propose a pDNS database architecture, and implement it to
be used for different types of DNS based research works. Our database system keeps
up with the speed of the pDNS stream without any significant degradation.
During our investigation on the malicious payload distribution channels in DNS,
we have discovered some research directions that can be explored as an extension to
the work presented in this dissertation.
1. Detection of multi-purpose malicious domains: Our proposed solution
might not be able to detect domains, which are used for different malicious
purposes. Our DNS zone based metrics can be extended with a semantic-aware
approach to investigate the traffic content by using some metrics proposed in
DNS tunnel detection studies.
2. Detection of rogue DNS resolvers: During our analysis, we noticed some
rogue open resolvers that are used for querying malicious domains. We believe
that these rogue resolvers are specifically chosen by botmasters, because they
are operated with loose security policies. These resolvers can be included as a
metric into our system for more accurate decision making process.
3. Flexible pDNS database architecture: Our pDNS database is scalable,
however it can be extended with another layer of database, which would allow
more flexible queries. Because we use a key-value based database solution, the
schema of the database is forced to be very simple. Therefore, queries are more
predetermined compared to queries in relational database systems.
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Appendix A
Description: A zone file is used to manage the RRs in a nameserver.
$ORIGIN example.com.
$TTL 86400
@ IN SOA ns1.example.com. hostmaster.example.com. (
2003021106 ; serial
10800      ; refresh after 6 hours
3600       ; retry after 1 hour
604800     ; expire after 1 week
86400 )    ; minimum TTL of 1 day
IN NS ns1.example.com.
IN NS ns2.example.com.
ns1 IN A 10.0.1.12
ns2 IN A 10.0.1.13
; name TTL class rrtype rdata
www 3600 IN A 10.0.1.10
remote 3600 IN A 10.0.1.11
otherservices 3600 IN A 10.0.1.15
ftp 3600 IN CNAME remote.example.com.
* 3600 IN CNAME otherservices.example.com.
;
Figure A.1: Simple Zone File
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Description: The schema of rrset and rrset reversed tables in our pDNS database
























Figure A.2: The Database Schema: RR Set Tables (+ stands for string concatenation)
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Description: The schema of rdata and rdata reversed tables in our pDNS database
























Figure A.3: The Database Schema: RR Data Tables (+ stands for string concatenation)
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Description: A sample python script for querying our pDNS database. It uses the
API of our system through HTTPS, and the result comes in JSON format.
Figure A.4: Sample Query by Using the API
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